winning, votes for these candidates cannot plausibly be rationalized by the supposing, as in Kanazawa (1998) and Bendor et al. (2003) , that people supposed their vote for them might lead to electoral success. Indeed, the only existing academic explanation for these small-party votes appears to be the Buchanan and Brennan (1984) idea that people derive utility from expressing an attitude by voting. The model presented here is related to this "expressive voting" idea in the sense that, unlike what is true in pivotal voter models, the purpose of voting is not primarily to affect the election's outcome.
The basic idea of the model, instead, is that people vote to signal their preferences (or type). The model differs from standard signaling models, however, in that people are not signaling to increase their own material payoffs. Rather, they are signaling to change other people's expectation of the distribution of types in the population. While a single vote has only a small effect on this expected distribution of types, it affects the perceptions of many people. An altruist that cares about the perceptions of many individuals, even if she cares about each of them only slightly, is thus induced to incur the cost of voting.
In models where people vote only because they care about who wins the election, one can use the notation of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) to write people's benefit from voting as P B, where B are the benefits from an electoral victory and P is the probability of casting the decisive vote. In actual elections, one observes relatively large turnout rates even in national elections in which P is virtually nil and this casts some doubt on the idea that people vote for this reason. For example, in the 2000 Presidential election in Massachusetts, 2.7 million people voted with George Bush getting 9 votes for every 16 votes obtained by Al Gore. Using Myerson's (2000) formulae, a Bush supporter has a probability of 3.5E-46 of being decisive if just 2500 people vote in an election in which an individual's probability of supporting Bush is 9/25. For Gore supporters, the probability of being pivotal is even smaller, and this probability falls dramatically as one goes from 2500 to 2.7 million voters.
That the probability of being pivotal plays a small role in voters' mind is confirmed by several surveys discussed in Blais (2000) . In surveys from the U.S. National Election Studies, Washington Post, October 22, 2004. for example, between 85 and 90% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "It isn't so important to vote when your party doesn't have a chance to win." (Blais, 2000, p. 94) . Blais (2000) also reports that a very small fraction of people who intend to vote would stop voting if "they were absolutely sure that there was no chance their vote could decide which side wins" (Blais, 2000, p. 71) . The model developed here is consistent with these findings.
Since voting is not principally motivated by the desire to affect who gets elected (or whether a proposition passes) turnout can be substantial even in cases where one vote is unlikely to be decisive.
One prediction of the pivotal voter model that is broadly consistent with observation is that turnout tends to be larger in elections with smaller margins of victory. In particular, the survey of this issue by Blais (2000) concludes that "Yes, turnout is higher when the race is closer, but a gap of ten points between the leading and the second parties seems to reduce electoral participation by only one point" (Blais, 2000, p. 137-8) .
What makes this effect important in spite of its relatively small magnitude is that it is unexpected from the point of view of several theories of voting. In particular, theories of expressive voting where people derive direct utility from expressing a point of view by voting do not predict any association between turnout and the margin of victory.
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The same is true if people vote only out of a sense of duty. Similarly, several observers have noted that Ferejohn and Fiorina's (1974) theory of voting, according to which people vote to avoid the regret of failing to vote for a candidate that loses, does not predict the observed relation between turnout and victory margin across elections.
In the elegant variant of the pivotal voter model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) , better informed voters are more likely to vote because they are less worried that their pivotal 2 Schuessler (2000) assumes that people vote to attach themselves to a group and further supposes that the benefits people obtain from this attachment depend on the group's size. This model of expressive voting should thus imply a connection between turnout and voting outcomes. These implications are likely to depend heavily on the properties one assumes about the benefits of attachment, however.
vote will lead an unqualified candidate to win the election. This is consistent with the observation reported in numerous studies starting with Campbell et al. (1960, p. 478 ) that more educated individuals are more likely to vote. It is also consistent with Wattenberg et al.'s (2000) observation that less informed voters are more likely to leave parts of their ballot blank. On the other hand, neither the theory that voting gives utility by allowing people to express a point of view nor the theory that people vote out of a sense of duty predicts these patterns.
As stressed by Cox (1997) the pivotal voter model is also successful in predicting "strategic voting". This is the tendency for individuals whose preferred candidate has a low probability of winning to vote for a candidate that they like somewhat less. This tendency was demonstrated in Cain (1978) . This study shows that in British parliamentary elections, survey respondents in close districts were more likely to have voted for candidates that were not the ones they preferred.
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This survey finding is consistent with Alvarez and Nagler (2000) , who
show that voters whose personal characteristics are correlated with voting for third parties are more likely to vote for more popular candidates in British districts where third party candidates have low support.
I now briefly give some intuition for how the proposed model is also able to explain strategic voting as well as the relationship between voting, electoral margin and education. The model implies that lopsided elections have lower turnout than close ones because the altruistic benefit from voting is smaller in the former. In lopsided elections, one of the candidates has few supporters and so relatively few people benefit when an additional individual votes for this candidate. Votes for the other candidate, on the other hand, have only a modest impact on the utility of that candidate's supporters because these supporters expect most people, including abstainers, to agree with them.
The reason uninformed individuals tend to abstain in the model is simple as well. By 3 Abramson et al. (1992) show a similar result for U.S. presidential primaries, where survey respondents are more likely to intend to vote for a candidate that does not score highest on their "feeling thermometers" when they feel that their preferred candidates has little chance of winning.
casting the "wrong" vote, these individuals have a chance of hurting rather than helping those that agree with them on matters of substance. They thus are better off not voting. Lastly, the model predicts strategic voting because individuals gain less vicarious utility when their vote raises the utility of only a small number of individuals. Thus, an individual who prefers a candidate with intrinsically low support may prefer to vote for his secondranked candidate. Doing so helps people that do not agree completely with the individual in question but which the individual may nonetheless feel somewhat empathetic towards.
The model in this paper is related to Jankowski (2002) and Fowler (2006) both of whom consider altruistic voters. In their models, altruists vote because they internalize other people's benefit from the election of a particular candidate. The current model shares these models' prediction that altruists with strong political opinions are more likely to vote (for which Fowler (2006) provides empirical support). My model differs in that I suppose that people also derive utility from discovering that others agree with them. This is what makes the probability of being pivotal less important in my model, and is also the source of the model's ability to explain votes for candidates that have essentially no probability of success.
Because it provides an alternate solution to the turnout puzzle while also relying on "social" preferences, it is worth mentioning Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) . In this model, people vote if it is in their group's interest to have them do so because, at least to some extent, they internalize the benefits to the group to which they belong. The altruism that I consider is one way of cementing such intra-group ties. The key difference between the Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) model an the one considered here is that voting is only geared to winning elections in the former. That model is thus unable to explain votes for "third-party" candidates that have no chance of electoral success since the group to which these voters belong presumably prefers one of the major candidates to the other.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the evidence for the psychological assumptions of the model. Section 2 presents the model's structure and characterizes its equilibria in two-candidate settings with common knowledge about candidates. Its main comparative statics concern the effect of closeness on turnout. Section 3 turns its attention to a setting where some of the voters have weak information about the candidates. This approach is meant to capture the effect of information on turnout as well as the reasons why people who show up to vote often abstain from voting in some individual races. Section 4 studies elections with more than two candidates. It shows that the model can easily rationalize votes for candidates with no prospect of victory. It also discusses strategic voting and "vote stealing," where the addition of a minor candidate takes electoral support away from a major one. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
1 Psychological Foundations
Attitude Similarity, Attraction and Benevolence
In Byrne (1961) , subjects reported more liking for people whose attitudes towards issues such as racial integration were more similar to theirs. Byrne (1961) first asked subjects to report their views on both political and lifestyle issues. They were then presented with answers to similar questions that were supposedly given by a bogus subject and were asked for their evaluation of this subject on a variety of scales. In this latter part of the experiment, subjects were also asked the extent to which "they liked" the bogus subject and the extent to which they would like to "work with" him or her. These latter two scales of interpersonal attraction proved to be strongly correlated with each other while also being correlated with the similarity between the subject's attitudes and those of the bogus subject.
Numerous variants of this study have been conducted (see Montoya and Horton 2004 for a recent example that discusses some of the earlier literature) and the correlation between measures of interpersonal attraction and measures of attitude similarity has proven to be robust. One variant that is particularly relevant for voting is discussed in Krosnick (1988) .
In this study, the attitudes of respondents in the American National Election Studied (NES) surveys were compared to the attitudes of presidential candidates (as measured by the NES respondents' average perception of the candidates attitudes) in the 1968 , 1980 US presidential elections. Krosnick (1988 shows that the extent to which respondent's report liking the Democratic candidate relative to the Republican candidate is positively correlated with the extent to which the respondents attitudes mirror those of the Democratic candidate as opposed to those of the Republican one.
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While suggestive, the correlation between attitude similarity and the expression of liking is not sufficient to establish that people will act differently towards people who share their beliefs than they will towards people that do not.
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There is, however, evidence of this sort from two different types of studies.
The first type is based on the "lost letter" technique.
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In Tucker et al. (1977) either a 2$ money order or 2$ of cash are left on the sidewalk to be picked up by a stranger. Attached to these funds are a contribution form and a stamped and addressed envelope that make it clear that the funds are intended for a medical charity. In at least some of the experiments, there is also a form where the purported contributor filled out an opinion questionnaire that was addressed to a polling organization. These packages were left in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood and the stated opinions were either favorable to American aid to Israel or opposed such aid. The cash, the money order and the questionnaire were all more likely 4 Brady and Sniderman (1985, p. 1067 ) also establish, using the NES survey, that people who describe themselves as liberals report warmer and more favorable feelings towards liberals than towards conservatives.
Self-described conservatives do the reverse.
5 One could argue, though, that voting for a candidate makes this candidate better off even if one ignores the electoral outcome because candidates like to receive support. Thus, voting for the candidate one likes can be construed as indirect evidence for the link between liking and helping. This evidence is subject to alternative interpretations, however. 6 The first use of this technique is reported in Milgram et al (1965) . In this study, stamped letters addressed to "Friends of the Communist Party," "Friends of the Nazi Party", "Medical Research Associates," and "Mr.
Walter Carnap" were dropped in New Haven sidewalks. The key finding of this study is that the latter two types were much more likely to be dropped in a mailbox and delivered by the post office. This original technique already suggests that altruism depends on the attitudes of recipients.
to be forwarded if the questionnaire contained pro-Israeli views, which is consistent with the idea that people are more inclined to help strangers if they agree with them. Notice in particular that people's desire to help the medical charity is not sufficient to explain this finding, since this would not explain a differential rate of forwarding the funds.
In a related study, Sole et al. (1975) used money orders for medical foundations that were attached to questionnaires relating to other political issues (including discrimination and the desirability of war). When the opinions expressed in these questionnaires matched more closely those opinions that were obtained from people chosen randomly in the same neighborhood, a larger fraction of the money orders was forwarded. This effect was stronger when the opinions related to important issues such as discrimination than when they referred to less important issues (such as whether groceries should be delivered for free). Karylowski (1978) carried out a different type of helping study where participants could help a bogus partner earn money by pressing buttons in response to stimulus lights. This helping experiment was carried out both before and after participants saw answers that the bogus partner supposedly completed about their preferred activities. In some cases this information made the bogus partner seem similar to the subject, because the answers corresponded closely to ones the subject had given earlier, while in others it did not. Experimental subjects helped their partners significantly more when the partner's self-description was more similar to their own. Because partner-subject similarity in this experiment concerns preferred activities rather than attitudes, the experiment might be seen as less relevant. However, the questionnaire literature shows that the correlation between similarity and "liking" is fairly robust to varying the dimension along which one measures similarity.
Other's Attitudes and One's Own Well-Being
The model's second key psychological ingredient is that an individual's utility increases when she learns that others share her opinions. Kenworthy and Miller (2001) provide direct evidence for this. They interviewed people in the street and first asked them whether they were for or against the death penalty. Some of the interviewees were then told that their position was held only by a minority of people, others that it was held by a majority. Some were told that the number of people holding the interviewees opinion was shrinking while others were told that it was growing. Interviewees were then asked to state how they felt about these (bogus) poll numbers using a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 represents "very bad"
and 4 represents "very good" .
The average response of the subjects that were told they were in a minority was equal to 2.37 and this was below both the neutral value of 2.5, and below 2.62, the mean value reported by those who were told they were in a majority. The average response by those told that their group was shrinking was equal to only 1.81, while those told that their group was growing was equal to 3.21. This suggests both that people's well being is larger when more people agree with them and that their well-being is particularly sensitive to up-to-date news about how other people's opinions have been changing. Elections, of course, are particularly effective at conveying such point-in-time news.
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Another study that measures the effect of other people's opinions on well-being is Pool et al. (1998) . They elicited attitudes towards an issue and then told subjects that a group that the students identified with held opposite views. This led to a measurable drop in reported self-esteem. One difference between the Pool et al. (1998) study and Kenworthy and Miller (2001) is that the former suggests only that the opinions of a group one wishes to be part of matter for self-esteem, while the latter suggests that the sheer total level of support matters as well.
One can also find more indirect evidence for this connection between well-being and atti-7 It also suggests that poll responses matter to people. This means that the model can also explain why people choose to respond to polls. This capacity of the model raises the question of why polls elicit less enthusiasm than elections both by those who read polls and those that respond to questionnaires. While detailed survey studies seems necessary to settle this question, one possibility is that individuals have more trust in the integrity of elections than they do in the integrity of pollsters.
tude similarity. One variable that is extremely strongly correlated with subjective measures of well-being is the extent to which individuals are satisfied with themselves, i.e. the extent to which they have high self-esteem. In their survey, Cheng and Furnham (2003, p. 923 ) report that "self-esteem has been reported to be one of the strongest predictors of well-being."
The literature studying the correlates of self-esteem is, in turn, vast. One of the leading theories of the determinants of self-esteem is the "sociometer theory". According to this theory, people's self esteem is a "monitor of social acceptance" (Leary 1999, p. 32) so that the "so-called self-esteem motive functions not to maintain self-esteem per se but rather to avoid social devaluation and rejection." It would follow from this that being liked by others would provide one with self-esteem, and thereby increase one's well-being. Leary (1999) also discusses some of the evidence that bears on this theory, though it should be pointed out that this evidence does not directly involve correlations of self-esteem with being liked by others.
Some evidence that seems more directly relevant to voting is provided by Boen et al. (2002) . They studied the display of political posters and lawn signs around the June 1999 election in Flanders. Their central finding is that posters and signs for parties that did better in these elections than in previous ones tended to be displayed for longer after the election than the posters and signs that supported parties whose performance declined. A different type of evidence for the effect of votes on well-being is provided in Libertarian 8 It should be noted, however, that the earlier study by Sigelman (1986) on Kentucky elections did not obtain these effects. Boen (2002) discusses reasons for these differences, some of which echo the reasons given by Sigelman (1986) for not finding "basking in reflected glory" in his own study.
candidate Harry Browne's report on the 2000 campaign.
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The first sentences of this report are "Like other Libertarians, I was disappointed with the vote total we received. I had hoped we would achieve two electoral breakthroughs: 1. Surpass a million votes for the first time. 
, and E i be the operator that takes expectations conditional on the information available to i. A lower value of E i (d(x i , x j )) then leads to a higher level of benevolence. Second, individual i's well-being depends on the extent to which she expects others to share his opinions perhaps because a high degree of opinion concordance makes i feel socially competent and thereby increases her self-esteem. One measurement of this concordance is the total distance D i
While this total distance appears like a reasonable first step for analyzing the impact of other people's opinions on a person's well-being, it is important to stress that the available psychological evidence is not sufficient to pin down the details of this dependence. It is possible, for example, that well-being depends on the average rather than the total distance.
For a given population size, this would have no effect on the equilibrium, but it would affect the impact of changes in the population size on equilibrium voting. It is also quite possible 
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Given that, as in Downs (1957) , individuals are also concerned directly with the outcome of the election, their "direct" payoffs y i can then be written as
where c i denotes the cost of voting. When taking actions, individuals care not only about their direct payoffs but also about the payoffs of others. At this point, individual i's total utility u i is
where
is the altruism of i for j. To capture the idea that people feel more benevolence for those that agree with them, the function λ is decreasing in its argument and reaches a maximum λ 0 when this argument equals zero. Consistent with the evidence in Andreoni (1989) , I suppose that the altruism in (3) is of the "warm glow" variety so that individual i derives utility from his own kind acts towards others while his utility does not depend on the pleasure that others derive from actions that i does not control.
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At the moment of voting, individual i maximizes his expectation of u i before the election,
An equilibrium is then a mapping from an individuals' tastes and costs of voting to a voting action, where this action can include abstaining. This mapping must ensure that, if individuals expect others to base their actions on this mapping, the action that maximizes E 0 i u i is consistent with this mapping as well.
10 With a nonlinear S, to which a linear S is just an approximation, the expectation before the election 
Symmetric Equilibrium with Two Types
This setup takes a particularly simple form when the vector x can only take two values Let z j be the probability that someone who favors x j actually votes. Using Bayes rule, the probability that someone who has abstained prefers x a isp wherẽ 
where N is the population eligible to vote, N j is the total number of people who vote for the candidate who prefers x j and J i is an indicator variable which equals one if individual i
The vote of individual i raises N a by one while also reducing the abstaining population
by one. This act of voting obviously has no effect on the D Individual i puts weight λ 0 on the former and weight λ 1 on the latter. . This means that, using (4),
This means that, by voting, i raises his expectation of
This result makes intuitive sense. The expectation of individual i before the election is simply that x a will be favored by a fraction p of all individuals other than himself. It is immediately apparent that this expectation is also the number of people that a supporter The model provides two motivations to vote. The first is through the outcome of the election, which affects people both directly and through their altruism for the people who are equally affected by this outcome. The second is that an increase in the number of people voting for a candidate leads equally minded individuals to revise upwards their estimate of the number of people who agree with them. It is well known that the first of these effects is not important if turnout is substantial and the costs of voting are strictly positive. Or, as Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) show in a closely related model, it leads to voting only by people whose costs of voting are arbitrarily close to zero if N is large. It is thus easier to start with equilibria where this effect is purposefully ignored. If it turns out that even people with nontrivial voting costs vote at this equilibrium, it follows that an equilibrium where people take into account their effect on outcomes is very close to the one that is computed ignoring this effect.
whereas it equals 
The first of these equations is a "reaction function" of the supporters of 
It follows from this equation that the model can account for large and realistic turnout rates for modest (and thus plausible) degrees of voter altruism. Suppose that λ 0 is equal to .05 so that each individual puts .05 as much weight on the utility of like-minded people as he does on his own. Suppose that S equals .001 of a penny so that an individual gains a penny when he discovers that another 1000 people agree with him and that, analogously to the US case, N equals 150 million. This corresponds to an individual gaining $15 when he learns that an additional 1% of the population agrees with him. Now consider a close election with p = .5. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium,p is equal to .5 as well. Equations (9) and (10) then imply that 
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Given that the model predicts large turnout even when voters ignore their effect on election outcomes, letting them take this effect into account does not have an important effect on the equilibrium. Since the effect of individual votes on the outcome is negligible, individuals whose costs of voting are exactly equal to G * , would move from indifference to having a strict preference for voting once they take into account their potential effect on the outcome. But individuals with even slightly higher costs would remain on the sidelines.
12 It might be imagined that rounding would destroy this result, but the model seems robust to rounding errors whose size is unpredictable both before and after the election. Suppose, in particular that votes are rounded to the nearest 100 but that voters expect the last two digits of the actual number of votes to be uniformly distributed between 00 and 99. By voting for a candidate they thus have a 1/100 chance of increasing by 100 other people's expectation regarding this candidates' vote total. Their expected benefit from one vote is thus 1/100 times the expected benefit from 100 votes, and these should be very close to the benefits calculated in the text.
The left hand side of (13) This fits with the conclusion of Blais (2000, p. 137-8) that "a gap of ten points between the leading and the second parties seems to reduce electoral participation by only one point."
As written, equation (13) implies that turnout should be increasing in the number of eligible voters N . For a given S , that is for a given increase in the utility of voters when there is one additional person that agrees with them, a larger N implies that more people benefit from this additional vote so that voters derive more vicarious utility from voting.
This result hinges crucially on the supposition that people care about the total distance D as opposed to caring about other functions of the d's. If, for example, people cared about the average distance between themselves and other voters in their jurisdiction, the analysis above would remain valid but S would be proportional to 1/(N − 1). Predicted turnout rates would then be independent of N .
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Thus, as discussed above, the model's implications regarding the effect of changes in the population depend on aspects of preferences about which more information is needed.
A more robust implication of the model would seem to be prediction that turnout should be larger in elections where there is not only a local candidate but also a nation-wide candidate. The reason is that a vote for a nation-wide candidate sends a self-relevant message to additional individuals. Blais (2000, p. 40) shows that, indeed, turnout in (sub-national) legislative elections is generally lower than in presidential elections.
The presidential election of the United States provides another type of evidence that seems robustly relevant for testing the model. In this election, the President is elected indirectly with voters choosing state-wide representatives to the electoral college, which then vote for the President. Because electoral college members are pledged to presidential candidates, votes in any state send a national message. N ought thus to represent the national electorate and p ought to represent the nation-wide average popularity of the candidate that prefers x a . Thus, the closeness that affects turnout is the closeness of the national election itself, rather than the closeness of the state-wide election for members of the electoral col- Individuals who expected this election to be closer were more likely to say they intended to vote. However, perceived closeness at the provincial level appears to be a better predictor of the intention to vote in this election than perceived closeness at the level of the constituency.
Consider now the effect of letting λ 1 differ from zero. The simplest case to consider is where p = .5 so that the outcome remains symmetric. The solution to (11) and (12) is then
This shows that animus towards people who support the other candidate (i.e. a negative λ 1 ) increases turnout in exactly the same way as does altruism towards people that support one's own candidate. When p is not equal to .5, the effect of a negative λ 1 is not the same on the turnout of both candidates. Still, it is straightforward to show that, when the system consisting of (11) and (12) 
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It is worth noting that while the model is one where costs of voting vary in the population while the altruism parameters are constant, one could obtain an essentially identical 14 Foster's (1984) study of turnout in US presidential elections shows a negligible cross-sectional correlation between a state's turnout and the closeness of the presidential election at the state level. Unfortunately, a time series analysis of national turnout in these elections is made difficult by the paucity of observations and the presence of low frequency movements in turnout. As a suggestive anecdote, it is worth mentioning that the total number of voters in Massachusetts and New York rose by 12% and 9% respectively from the presidential election of 1996 to the much closer presidential election of 2004. This occurred even though the populations in these two states were stagnant and even though the electoral college results in all four of these elections were a foregone conclusion at the time. (2) there is an essentially identical equilibrium. At this equilibrium, people with costs exactly equal to G * abstain because they dislike the outcome that their vote might induce. However, because the probability of affecting the outcome is so small given the large turnout, people with even slightly lower c i do vote. While it is true that they help to bring about a disliked outcome, their effect on the outcome is so small that this effect is swamped by their desire to reduce the D of the people they feel altruism towards.
It is also worth noting that the equilibrium where people vote for the candidate they voter models such as Brennan and Buchanan (1984) the idea that voters vote to express an opinion (rather than to affect the election outcome). Where the current model differs is in supposing that this desire to express oneself is the result of seeking to help others, as opposed to being directly useful to the self. This is the source of the comparative statics implied by the model. dislike may be attractive to those in the minority. Nonetheless, equilibria where people all vote for the candidate they dislike are unattractive. They probably arise in this model because it neglects two important real-world phenomena. The first is the process by which candidates get selected, which usually requires that like-minded people make a consistent effort in favor of a candidate. The second, which is closely related, is the opportunity people have to communicate their intentions to vote before the election. One might wonder whether this communication is credible in the presence of a secret ballot. However, even with this institution, voting can be credibly revealed if lying is detectable (which it often is).
A modification of the model that incorporates elements of these two phenomena does not have these these unappealing equilibria. 3 Poorly Informed Voters Campbell et al. (1960) show that many individuals are poorly informed about candidates.
In their sample of respondents, only 40 to 60 percent of the people who had an opinion on an issue "perceive party differences and hence can locate one or the other party as closer to their 'own' position" (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 180) . At the same time, there appears to exist a correlation between being informed and voting. More educated individuals are more likely to vote, as are individuals who describe themselves as "paying attention to political campaigns" (Campbell et al. 1960 p. 103 There are three sources of uncertainty that might justify this modelling approach. In the first, it is costly for people to interpret the messages sent by candidates.
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In the second, people know their preference for policy consequences, but are uncertain about the consequences of the policies that are being discussed during election campaigns. People thus have difficulty converting campaign proposals into matches with their own preferences. In the third, people differ in the personal qualities that they want in an elected official and these qualities are difficult to discern because both candidates seek to demonstrate that they rate highly on all the qualities that are of interest to voters. individuals. When the true state is 0, the signal equals 0 with probability β. Similarly, it equals 1 with probability β when the true state is 1. Because the two states are equally likely ex ante, Bayes rule implies that the conditional probability that the true state is 0 when the signal is 0 equals β as well. By appropriate choice of signal labels, β > .5 so that observing a signal of 0 makes it more likely that the true state is 0 and that informed supporters of x a prefer candidate m.
Suppose that the group of individuals who know which candidate they prefer vote for that candidate, if they vote at all. which drew the "incorrect" signal s = 1. This means that, using Bayes rule
where z Using the same logic, the probabilities that voters for n and abstainers support x
The conditional probability that, in state 0, a voter prefers x b given that he votes for m, n or that he abstains are given respectively by the probabilities that are complementary to P (a|m, 0), P (a|n, 0) and P (a|A, 0).
Individual i cares about voting in this model because his vote affects the expected distance 
while the corresponding change when there is an additional vote for n and one less abstention
In these definitions of the δ's, a 0 subscript indicates that there has been an additional vote that is compatible with those of informed voters (i.e. a "favorable" vote) while a 1 indicates the addition of an incompatible one. It follows from (17) in (2) is ignored. These gains differ depending on whether the individual is informed, so that his vote is sure to be seen as favorable by those that agree with him, or whether he is not.
An informed supporter of x a who goes from abstaining to voting for the correct candidate
Similarly, the act of voting raises the E
Uninformed individuals have a probability β of observing a signal that is identical to the true state. This means that their expected gains from voting equal β times the increase in 
Similarly, the effect of voting on the E
An equilibrium is a set of four maximum values of c i , one each for informed and uninformed individuals that support both x j 's such the people whose voting costs are below these maximum values vote and the rest abstains. These maximum values must ensure that equations (19), (20), (21) and (22) equal zero when the turnout rates z and w used to compute δ a 0 and δ a 1 correspond to these maximal voting costs. Using (17) and (18), the resulting equilibrium conditions are
As before, substantial turnout at the solution to these equations ensures that these solutions are essentially indistinguishable form those that result from including the −d e (x i ,x) terms in (2). Moreover, by continuity, the equilibria that satisfy these four equations continue to have substantial turnout by both informed and uninformed individuals as long as β is close to 1.
Unfortunately, computing and characterizing these equilibria is more complicated for the is to show that the turnout rate of less informed voters, w is smaller than the turnout rate of the more informed ones.
In the symmetric case, (23) and (25) become
is less than β so the right hand side of the second equation is smaller than the right hand side of the first one for any positive z and w. This means that any positive w and z combination that solves this equation has w < z. Given that w < z, the first of these equations also implies that the equilibrium value of z with β < 1 is lower than that which results when everyone is fully informed about the relationship between the x j 's and the candidates.
The intuition for this second result is that the existence of individuals whose votes do not reveal their stance on x j implies that voting is less useful even for informed individuals as a mechanism for communicating political attitudes. This effect also tends to reduce the turnout of uninformed individuals because their voting message is garbled even when their signal s leads them to vote for the same candidate as the informed individuals that agree with them. Uninformed individuals reduce their turnout further because they also know that they have a chance of voting for a candidate that is not the one that is chosen by the informed people who agree with them and that, in this case, their vote is particularly uninformative.
It is worth noting that, if uncertainty is sufficiently acute that β = .5, the model predicts that uninformed individuals with even a trivial cost of voting would abstain. To see this, note that the right hand side of (28) is zero when β = .5. In this extreme case, the model can thus account for rolloff, where an individual who is already voting for a major candidate decides to abstain in a different race so as to avoid the cost of filling in the appropriate ballot entry.
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This fits with the evidence of Wattenberg et al. (2000) that uninformed individuals 21 One obvious question raised by this analysis is whether rolloff becomes more common as the election becomes less close because p differs from .5.
are more likely to rolloff and that rolloff is smaller in states like Indiana where voters can vote for straight "party tickets" with a single punch or pull of a lever.
The Addition of a Third Candidate
Even though most of this paper has focused on just two candidates, the presence of "third"
candidates provides some of the most troubling evidence against theories where people vote This leads Lacy and Burden (1999) to view Ross Perot's entry into the presidential race as having led to both increased turnout and to "vote-stealing" from candidates with more votes.
Vote stealing from viable candidates by non-viable candidates is in some sense the opposite of "strategic voting," which refers to a situation where candidates with some chance of getting elected receive votes from individuals who actually prefer a less viable candidate.
Strategic voting has been widely studied in the empirical literature, and evidence for this phenomenon has sometimes been treated as evidence for models where people vote in the hope of being pivotal. One aim of this section is to show that observations that resemble strategic voting can arise in models where the motivation for voting is quite different.
The most stripped down model where these issues can be discussed has three potential Before carrying out this analysis, it is worth stating the benefits of voting for the various types in some generality. Define V j as the set of types that vote for candidate j. If the set of types that votes for a particular candidate j consists of a single type i, then the probability that an individual is of type i given that he has voted for candidate j, P (i|j) is equal to one, and P (k|j) = 0 for all k = i. More generally
For an individual who abstains, the probability that he is of type i is
The change in E 1 i D i for a member of type j when someone other than i himself moves from abstaining to voting for candidate k is δ j k where
The effect on the total utility of an individual of type i of voting for candidate k is thus
where c is the individual's cost of voting and the equivalence sign serves to define G i j so that it now equals the benefit that j derives from voting for k divided by the constant S (N − 1).
In equilibrium the set V j thus consists of
On the basis of the argument made earlier in the two type case, I focus on equilibria where types who only like one candidate (namely a, b and g) always vote for the candidate that shares their views when such a candidate is available. I also focus on the equilibrium where type g individuals abstain when is unavailable.
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This allows me to focus on the behavior of type h individuals. These find it attractive to vote for m in a two-candidate race 22 This assumption could be put on a stronger footing by supposing that type g individuals have animus for type a and b so that they do not want to help swell the number of people that appear to agree with them.
between m and n and the issue that arises is then how they vote in a three-way race. In the two-candidate race, the equilibrium values of G i j are thus
where z g = 0.
Equations (30) and (33) What the analysis does show is a more general phenomenon, namely that the model predicts that the turnout of individuals who do not support the third candidate is also affected by the entry of this candidate into the race. Whether this is important in actual elections remains a question for empirical research.
When there are three candidates, the gains to types g and h from voting for are related to G g and G h which are given by
For the marginal individual of type j to be indifferent between voting and not voting for candidate k if voting costs are distributed according to F , we must have
In equilibrium, these conditions must hold for all G i j such that type i is in V j , for all types that vote for j. Solving these equilibrium conditions analytically is difficult because the equations are nonlinear. I thus focus on special cases which illuminate whether type h individuals for m, for or for both.
This analysis is based on the difference between the benefit that an individual of type h garners by voting for m and the benefit he garners by voting for . This difference is Conditional on a party having a low popularity (so that it is unlikely to win), Alvarez and Nagler (2000) show that its vote total declines further if the gap between the leading parties is small. This second finding is related but not identical to the model's prediction that m 
The first of these expressions is positive when the expression in (37) equals zero, though it becomes negative if the expression in (37) is sufficiently greater than zero. The second expression is always negative and this implies that increases in z h raise the attractiveness of voting for . The reason is that, when z h is low, a interprets increases in the vote total for as mainly bad news because he sees these votes as likely to originate with g. By contrast, when z h is higher, extra votes for are interpreted by a as being likely to be due to h, and such votes thus increase a's utility.
The result is that multiple equilibria are possible once again. Simple examples that 23 The difference is that the gap between the leading parties would also be large if p a were large and p b were small, and the model would not predict low votes for m in this case. Since the districts in question are ones where the support for the party in question is small, however, it seems unlikely that these are frequently districts where the support for the party that is relatively similar to the party in question is extremely large.
Thus, lopsided districts where the party in question receives low votes are likely to be ones where the similar party can expect low support as well.
illustrates this can be constructed by fixing the total turnout levels of each type. For this configuration of parameters (37) is positive, but equal to .025 and thus relatively small in absolute value. If λ ah is larger than .4, this expression rises beyond .05 and there is no longer any equilibrium where type h individuals vote for . Similarly, if λ ah is lower than .27, the expression in (37) equals -.015 and there is no equilibrium where any type h individuals vote for m. Thus, the formula in (37) does appear to offer a good guide for whether vote stealing or strategic voting is possible, with the proviso that there can be multiple equilibria for parameters that lead this expression to be close to zero.
The analysis in this section has been cast as one where a single candidate is chosen under a plurality rule. However, as long as individuals have a single vote and see their probability of being pivotal as negligible, the analysis applies equally to a multi-member district where representatives are chosen by proportional representation. This could be seen as a source of concern because Blais and Carty (1991) show that elections under proportional representation involve larger vote totals for third parties as well as more parties contesting each election. There is, however, very little evidence that proportional representation is the source of these additional votes and parties. Rather, Colomer (2005) and several sources he cites suggest that the existence of additional popular parties preceded historically the establishment of proportional representation systems. This raises the question of what forces lead parties and candidates to enter political contests while also suggesting that the model may be accurate in predicting that voting behavior for a given range of candidates is independent of the electoral system.
Conclusion
The model of voting in this paper is both derived from assumptions about human psychology that have some empirical support and predicts patterns of voting that fit with some existing empirical evidence. It is important to stress, however, that the model's assumptions and predictions could both be subject to much sharper tests than those that have already been carried out in the literature. Indeed, one of the principal strengths of the model is that seems to be possible to check not only its qualitative predictions but also some of its quantitative ones.
The model seems particularly amenable to testing with surveys and survey experiments.
One implication of the model is that people ought to be more willing to vote for their preferred candidate if they believe that there are more people who favor this candidate (since this implies that the person's vicarious gain from voting is larger). Whether this is true could be studied by giving people information about a candidate's support and analyzing whether this information affects voting intentions.
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Another implication of the model's logic is that an individuals's vote depends not only on how much she likes her preferred candidate but also on how much she likes other supporters of this candidate. Since voting is geared at increasing the utility of other supporters, an individual ought to be more likely to vote for her favorite candidate the more she likes the candidate's other supporters. This too could be studied empirically, in this case by eliciting 25 I am grateful to Alan Gerber and Don Green for this suggestion. 
